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Key points 
Index-based insurance continues to be promoted as an 
effective approach for offering formal insurance to rural 
households in developing countries while little has been 
done to assess the risk coverage provided by such products. 
Products with poor quality could increase risk—in a manner 
very similar to a lottery ticket—rather than reduce it— 
as the term ‘insurance’ implies. Currently, there is little 
empirical evidence to support the insurance label used by 
designers, promoters and vendors of index insurance. 
The Index-Based Livestock Insurance (IBLI) product, 
piloted in northern Kenya and southern Ethiopia since 
early 2010, is implemented with an accompanying research 
program that allows for a first-ever analysis of index 
insurance quality in a developing country context. This brief 
draws on an analysis of the IBLI product in Marsabit by 
Jensen, Barrett and Mude (2015). Our key findings include:
•	 Although drought is by far the largest killer of livestock, 
there is a great deal of variation in livestock mortality 
rates among households, even during droughts. 
•	 This idiosyncratic risk, specific to an individual and 
not captured by the experiences common to all 
people in the area, cannot be covered by index 
insurance products, which offer coverage only for 
covariate risks – the average experience common to 
all people in the area.
•	 IBLI successfully provides coverage for 63% of the 
covariate risk faced by pastoralists, a very significant 
share.
•	 Utility simulations show that households are better 
off with IBLI coverage than without, even under the 
commercially loaded and unsubsidized rate, implying 
that IBLI provides considerable risk coverage as 
opposed to offering households access to a lottery.
Introduction 
Environmental shocks are drivers of poverty as well as a 
fact of life in many rural areas of the developing world. In 
the developed world, agricultural insurance provides some 
protection from such calamities. But conventional insurance 
products have not reached many rural households in 
developing countries due to the high costs of gathering 
information relative to the size of policies demanded and 
well-known moral hazard, and adverse selection issues that 
complicate product design and pricing.
Recently, there has been much excitement around 
the use of index-based insurance, as an alternative to 
conventional insurance products, to extend the rural 
poor’s access to formal insurance coverage in developing 
countries (Alderman & Haque 2007; Barnett, Barrett 
& Skees 2008; Mahul & Stutley 2010). Index insurance 
provides indemnity payments based on a signal that 
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is related to covariate losses rather than actual and 
observed individual losses. When signals are chosen 
properly—those that are easy to observe in near-real-
time, exogenous to the behaviours and characteristics of 
both the insurer and insurees, and highly correlated with 
the insured risk—suppliers of index insurance face much 
lower costs associated with adverse section, moral hazard 
monitoring, and validation of claims than they would if 
they were offering conventional policies.
For instance, seasonal precipitation is highly correlated with 
average maize yields in some areas. In those cases, an index 
insurance product developed using area-average seasonal 
precipitation may offer maize growers protection against 
low maize yields associated with precipitation. Premium 
and indemnity rates for such products are calculated 
in relation to estimates of precipitation, rather than 
household-level losses, so that an individual’s characteristics 
and actions have very little or no effect on either. For 
providers of index insurance, there is no need to collect 
individual level data for setting premiums, validating claims 
or monitoring for moral hazard.
Growing enthusiasm for index insurance among 
researchers and development and humanitarian 
organizations has led to a proliferation of pilot projects 
across the globe. For example, interest in supporting index 
insurance as a development tool led to the formation of 
the Global Index Insurance Facility in 2009, which has now 
supported projects that have insured more than 600,000 
farmers (GIIF 2014). 
Basis risk, or the risk that insured households continue 
to face after purchasing an index insurance contract, is a 
widely recognized Achille’s heel of these new products 
and is thought to be quite sizable by some (e.g. Miranda 
& Farrin 2012). Such basis risk arises due to variation 
between farmers, leading to inevitable differences between 
the individual losses and average losses (idiosyncratic risk), 
as well as differences between the index and actual average 
losses (design risk). Until now, however, there have been 
very few empirical studies of the magnitude of basis risk 
associated with index insurance products for smallholder 
agriculturalist households in developing countries. No pilot 
project to date appears to have examined how insured 
individuals’ actual losses correlate with the index on which 
the index insurance contract is based. If that correlation 
is weak, index insurance offers little risk coverage; indeed 
if the correlation is negative, it may increase the risk that 
some insurees face. For those households, index insurance 
represents a gamble in spite of the ‘insurance’ label – they 
pay a fee for the chance of a payout but also increase 
the variance of their stochastic income. Commercially 
loaded index insurance, for which the premium exceeds 
the actuarially fair price in order to cover the insurer’s 
costs, can therefore be more like a lottery ticket than an 
indemnity insurance policy for some households. Without 
careful empirical analysis we do not know where index 
products fall on the spectrum between full risk coverage 
and lottery tickets, and for which clientele. 
Unfortunately, the general enthusiasm for index insurance 
has not been accompanied by parallel investments to 
ascertain the quality or extent of the coverage offered by 
index products and the remaining basis risk that insurees 
continue to bear. In response to this need, Jensen, Barrett 
and Mude (2015) studied the distribution of basis risk 
associated with the IBLI product in northern Kenya. 
Specifically, we decompose basis risk into its idiosyncratic 
and design components to better understand how the 
IBLI product could be improved and then examine if IBLI 
benefits those that purchase coverage.
IBLI in Marsabit, Kenya 
IBLI was launched in Marsabit, Kenya in January 2010 
to insure pastoralists against livestock mortality 
associated with drought. The insurance policy payouts 
are determined by an index of predicted division-
average livestock mortality rates. At the time of this 
research, IBLI used an index that was developed using 
statistical methods to relate historic livestock mortality 
to remotely sensed Normalized Differenced Vegetation 
Index (NDVI) measures and minimized basis risk 
(Chantarat, et al. 2013).1
We used four rounds of data from an annual household 
longitudinal survey (2009-2012) and IBLI index values to 
study the distribution of basis risk associated with IBLI 
across eight insurance seasons.2  Decomposing household 
risk into covariate and idiosyncratic components, we found 
that Marsabit pastoralists face a great deal of idiosyncratic 
risk that cannot be covered with an index insurance 
product. This is surprising in this population for which 
severe drought—a covariate phenomenon—is recognized 
as being the greatest source of risk. Furthermore, 
regression analysis of idiosyncratic losses finds that such 
losses are mostly random and are unrelated to observed 
household characteristics or heterogeneity between 
communities within index regions.
Basis risk 
Histograms of the reported livestock survival rates 
and simulated net survival rates—the survival rate less 
the loaded and unsubsidized premium plus indemnity 
payments—illustrate the impact of IBLI coverage and give 
insight into the distribution of basis risk (Figure 1). 
IBLI coverage clearly changes the domain, expected 
value, and shape of the distribution of outcomes. The 
average net impact of full insurance on the eight season 
within-household distribution of outcomes is to improve 
skewness at the cost of reducing expected outcomes (due 
to the premium) and increasing variance (due to excessive 
indemnity payments). Put more simply, IBLI reduces 
downside risk exposure but at a cost of not only the 
premium, but also of a wider range of possible outcomes 
because basis risk raises the possibility that one could pay 
a premium and (i) suffer losses but receive no indemnity 
payment, or (ii) receive an indemnity payment without 
suffering losses.
1. Variations on this IBLI product are available outside the region examined in this 
paper. The indices used in each region are not identical due to variation in the needs 
and constraints of each region.
2. The IBLI household survey data are publically available at https://livestockinsurance.
wordpress.com/publications/.
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Looking only at events during which there were large 
covariate shocks—the events IBLI is intended to provide 
protection from—we find that IBLI coverage successfully 
provides protection from 63% of the covariate risk but that 
households continue to face about 69% of their original 
risk because of the large idiosyncratic component, even 
during drought seasons. These findings suggest that there 
is room for improving the IBLI index, but that even with 
a perfect index, households will always face a substantial 
amount of uninsured idiosyncratic risk. But those statistics 
alone cannot tell us if IBLI is providing insurance coverage 
or access to a lottery for the majority of households.
To address this question, we modelled the benefits to 
prospective purchasers with and without IBLI coverage.3 
Consistent with the product during this research period, 
we maintained two contract premium regions – Upper 
Marsabit (Maikona and North Horr) and Lower Marsabit 
(Central, Laisamis, Loiyangalani) – which were then used to 
estimate and include the cost of premium payments in the 
calculations. 
At the subsidized rate, which brings premiums below their 
actuarially fair rate, households might benefit from IBLI 
even if it does not reduce risk since, over time, they expect 
to receive more in indemnity payments than they pay in 
premiums. At the commercially loaded premium rate, risk 
averse households will only prefer IBLI coverage if it offers 
insurance coverage (i.e. reduces downside risk) rather 
than a gamble. We find that most—but not all—risk averse 
households enjoy net benefits from purchasing IBLI, even at 
unsubsidized rates (Table 1). 
Table 1. The benefits of IBLI coverage
Subsidized rate1 Commercial rate2
Lower Upper Lower Upper
Proportion of households 
better off with IBLI than 
without
0.998 0.939 0.560 0.605
Notes: 1 During the period of this research, the annual subsidized rates are Lower 
Marsabit=3.325% and Upper Marsabit=5.5%. 2 The annual commercial premium 
rates are Lower Marsabit=10.0%, and Upper Marsabit=10.7%.
3. More specifically, we modelled household expected utility defined over the natural 
logarithm of livestock holdings, assuming constant relative risk aversion and a unit 
coefficient of risk aversion. For technical details, please consult the underlying paper.
Figure 1. Histograms of livestock survival rate and net livestock survival rate with full insurance.
Notes: Counts of the numbers of observations less than zero, between zero and one, and greater than one appear in green at the top of each figure.
Conclusions 
Our analysis supports the commonly held, but rarely 
examined, belief that index insurance suffers from 
considerable basis risk. But we also found that IBLI 
nonetheless offers significant benefits to most households, 
even at commercially loaded premium levels, because it 
provides indemnity payments during critical periods of 
high livestock mortality. For that majority, IBLI operates 
as advertised, offering an insurance product against 
large drought shocks. But any index insurance product 
necessarily offers incomplete coverage. The community 
promoting these innovations might take greater care to 
ensure that they are indeed filling missing markets for 
insurance, not for lottery tickets.
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